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I. “Ego sum Blaxius”2 
Blasius of Parma is an important thinker whose theories of mind and cognition have yet to receive 
the kind of attention they undoubtedly deserve. A good statement of the original views of this author 
can be found in the following passage from someone who wrote extensively on Blasius of Parma, 
Graziella Federici Vescovini:  
 
Questa dottrina [Blasius’ philosophy of mind] implica una concezione dell’anima come forma 
materiale o semplice principio attivo, in cui l’operazione sensibile non è distinta 
sostanzialmente da quella intellettiva. (…) il sensus agens o capacità conoscitiva della 
sensazione, coincide con l’intera anima umana (…) L’anima è una unica forma naturale per 
la quale le virtù sensibili e intelletuali non si distinguono sostanzialmente o formalmente tra 
di loro.3 
 
In this passage, Federici Vescovini points out two key topics found in Blasius and the historical 
context he belongs to, namely the question of the unity of the soul and the question of the agent sense. 
But, even for someone acquainted with these questions, the theses she attributes to Blasius on the 
subjects of mind and cognition are striking: Blasius holds that the soul is a material form; that the 
soul is an active principle that it manifests itself through its cognitive operations; that the soul’s 
sensory operations are not substantially distinct from the intellective ones; and finally, that the agent 
sense is that power that combines and integrates the whole human soul in the process of acquiring 
knowledge. I take Vescovini to be right in her assessment and that scholars have failed, for the most 
                                               
1 The author would like to acknowledge the funding from the European Research Council under the ERC grant agreement 
n. 637747 for the project Rationality in Perception: Transformations of Mind and Cognition 1250-1550. I have greatly 
benefited from questions and comments from the audience in at the Blasius of Parma Conference in Tours.   
2 Le Quaestiones de anima di Biagio Pelacani da Parma. Florence 1974, 75.  
3 In her Introduction to Le Quaestiones de anima di Biagio Pelacani da Parma. Florence 1974, 23. For a more elaborated 
account of these claims, see G. Federici Vescovini, Le Teorie della luce e della visione ottica dal IX al XV Secolo. Perugia 
2003, 319-58.  
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part, to grasp the importance of this position. The aim of this paper is precisely to underscore the 
importance of Blasius’ views by examining in detail those theses attributed to him on the nature of 
the soul and the process of cognition. My only corrective suggestion to Vescovini’s statement is that 
we talk about the activity of sense rather than the agent sense, meaning that the soul is active in 
perception because the sensitive and intellective aspects come together in a joint operation, rather 
than attributing that activity to one particular power.4 
 In order to understand the significance of Blasius’ position, I suggest that we start by asking 
two questions: first, what does it mean to talk about “activity in perception” and second, what does it 
mean to say that activity in perception expresses the unity of the sensible and intellective aspects of 
the human soul? The reason why it seems relevant to ask these questions is that what is most striking 
in Blasius’ position is not the claim of ontological unity of the soul, whereby sensitive and intellective 
aspects are taken to be one and the same, but the use of that principle to make an epistemological 
claim concerning the active nature of perception. In what follows, I examine how the claim 
concerning the simple nature of the human soul grants its support to a theory of the activity of the 
soul in perception. In other words, this paper answers the following question: do certain epistemic 
consequences, namely the activity of the soul, follow from ontological claims, namely the unity of 
the soul? In order to answer this question, I focus on two works by Blasius of Parma, the Quaestiones 
de anima, especially question 8 from book I and question 4 from book II; and the Questiones super 
Perspectiva Communi.  
  
II. The first ontological thesis: identity 
The focus on these two works and the order of presentation is not arbitrary, as will soon become clear. 
In the Questiones de anima (Qa, hereafter), Blasius starts by first proving the materiality of the human 
soul and only then elaborates on the unity of its sensitive and intellective aspects. It is important to 
notice how he builds many of the arguments for the claim of the non-separable nature of the soul on 
the non-independence of its operations. Blasius insists that we should be wary of concluding the 
separability of the soul from the possibility of it realizing or executing the operations proper to it 
                                               
4 Although the identification of the activity of sense with the agent sense (as expressing the joint operation of sense and 
intellect in the sensitive operations) has often been suggested by interpreters, like Vescovini, the textual evidence 
produced to support this association is thin at best. In fact, this is a charitable reading: I have not found in the literature 
any passage by Blasius that unequivocally states this identification, except in those texts whose attribution to Blasius is 
disputed (as in question 10 from book two of the Quaestiones de anima edited by Vescovini 1974, 149-56). The complete 
edition of the text will allow us to formulate a more qualified interpretation and thus I remain neutral to this identification. 
This does not, in any case, affect the significance of the theory of mind and cognition Blasius proposes, nor my reading 
of it. I would like to thank Joël Biard for insisting on this point. 
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without the body. The conditional case upon which the conclusion is built, namely that “If the soul 
has an operation proper to itself, it is separated from the body,” must simply be false because it is 
possible for the soul to both have an operation proper to itself and to be inseparable from the body.5 
In his words,  
 
The corollary [of the argument] is this: [from] the soul having or not having an operation 
proper to itself, it should not be concluded that the soul is separated or not from the body, 
although it can be separable.6 (emphasis added) 
 
This is the case, he argues, independent of the fact that the soul is characterized by its activity or 
passivity in that same operation, which was an argument used to show that if the soul is tied to matter, 
by being its informing principle, it must be passive and thus not have an operation of its own. Blasius 
continues by showing that for an operation to be proper to a given entity, the exercise of this operation 
cannot depend on another, i.e. to originate in another (literally, be “from another,” ab alio). This 
“other” can be either another faculty, if we are focusing on the power of the intellect, or another entity 
like the body, or even another element of the cognitive process, like a representation of the object to 
be known.  
 Focusing on the intellect, Blasius notes that there is an important distinction between the 
habitual and the actual operations of the intellective soul. Let us consider the case of habitual 
operations first: is the soul able to perform these without being dependent on the body? Although it 
seems that the intellect is able to consider truths it has in itself, to freely judge and speculate about 
them, Blasius remarks that these operations are nevertheless instantiated in matter because the 
intellect exists in an embodied condition.7 So, in what concerns habitual cognition, the intellect 
depends on the body. As for actual operations, which require the presence of the object to be realized, 
Blasius notes that the thing needs to be the concurrent cause of that particular cognitive act, if that 
                                               
5 “Unde, sicut dicebatur in una propositione, possibile est quod anima habeat operationem propriam et nunquam separetur 
a corpore.”, Qa I.8, 62.  
6 “Corollarium per hoc, quod est: animam habere operationem propriam vel non habere, non potest concludi quod anima 
separabitur a corpore vel non separabitur, licet bene sit separabilis,” Qa I.8, 62. 
7 “Ultima conclusio, quod intellectus humanus in eius actuali operatione utatur organo corporeo non potest reprobari,” Qa 
III.2, 128. An argument against the necessity of the intellect being immaterial in order to think universally is already 
presented by John Buridan in De anima III.8: see J. Zupko, John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and 
Translation of Book III of his “Questions on Aristotle’s De anima” (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical 
and Interpretative Essays. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University 1989.  
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act is to be about that thing.8 To claim otherwise would be to say that the soul has, prior to any 
cognitive act, the species of all things there are, so that it would be able to know that simply by 
looking inside itself to that pool of cognitive resources. His answer is illustrative: 
 
First, no rose existing, you cognize no rose. This is proved because it follows that, [if] you 
cognize a rose, the rose is cognized by you; therefore, it follows that the rose is cognized by 
you. I ask, thus, whether the subject of this proposition stands for something or for nothing. 
If [it stands] for nothing, you know nothing by means of this proposition: ‘the rose is cognized 
by you’. If [it stands] for something, I ask what that something is; it either is something or 
nothing [at all]; and if [it is] something, it is clear that it is nothing but a rose. This however 
contradicts what has been granted, [i.e.] that if there is nothing, you cognize nothing.9  
 
The answer is to show that the soul can know a thing, even if that thing goes out of existence, by 
means of species representing that thing; but for that to be the case, the representing species must be 
received, processed, and retained by the soul. This reception, however, requires the body. Thus, 
Blasius argument is that one must accept that, for the intellect to exercise its cognitive operations, it 
depends on another: in fact, on two others, the body and the species representing the thing.  
 In several places, Blasius considers the kind of arguments that would allow for the conclusion 
that the soul is indeed separable from the body, and even that God is capable of performing that 
separation and guaranteeing its existence in the disembodied state. Blasius is unequivocal in assessing 
the value of those arguments: he takes them to be both possible and at best probable, thus far from 
being evident. Above all, he takes the claim that the soul is separable as not being contrary to reason, 
meaning that God could make it so, but that is not to say that stating it or believing in it suffices as 
evidence for that to be the case (Qa I.8, 75-7). Blasius applies the same degree of skepticism to the 
claim that God directly and immediately creates the intellective soul: “it is possible,” he remarks, 
“but it is not evident”.10 His argument is that we cannot have (or, at least that we do not have) either 
experiential or other kind of proof of the truth of that proposition, although one can accept it on the 
                                               
8 “anima intellectiva nulla cognitione informata non habet operationem propriam. Probatur, quia talis indiget causante ut 
informante sicut odore, et requiritur praesentia obiecti causantis”, Qa I.8, 65.  
9 “Primum: nulla rosa existente tu non intelligis rosam. Probatur, quia sequitur, tu intelligis rosam, ergo a te intilligitur 
rosa; ergo sequitur quod rosa intelligitur a te. Quaero, tunc, vel subiectum istius propositionis supponat pro aliquo, vel 
pro nullo. Si pro nullo, ergo nihil intelligis per istam propositionem, rosa intelligitur a te. Si pro aliquo, quaero quid est 
illud, vel illud est aliquid vel nihil; et si aliquid clarum est quod illud non est nisi rosa. Hoc autem repugnat casui concesso, 
si nihil habetur quod nihil intelligis,” Qa I.8, 68. 
10 “quod anima intellective hominis sit a deo create, est possibile, sed non evidens.”, Qa I.8, 77 
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basis of authority.11 But, he further notices that what is accepted on the basis of authority rather than 
evidence, especially of the natural kind, cannot be considered proper knowledge and thus falls outside 
the scope of the interests and expertise of the natural philosopher. If, on the other hand, we take 
natural evidence as proof, we do know that  
 
nothing prohibits that matter [i.e. the body], disposed by natural pure [celestial elements], 
receives the form which has the power to discern, syllogize, etc., and which is called 
intellective [soul] by the common people.12 
 
From this statement, we are left to conclude that all sorts of things can come into being as the result 
of the influence of celestial bodies on the sub-lunar ones, namely things that traditionally, and on the 
basis of faith and authority, have been thought to be directly created by God, like the intellective soul. 
For Blasius, however, the human intellective soul is educed from the potency of matter.13 He further 
denies that this requires the existence in matter of certain preparatory dispositions of a substantial 
kind, like the nutritive and sensitive soul in the plurality of forms tradition. But, he does accept the 
existence in matter of dispositions of a qualitative sort that prepare this process of educing.14 To some 
extent, however, this last aspect is a detail of the really significant philosophical position Blasius 
defends here, namely that the human intellective soul is educed from matter just like any other 
material form and thus that it does not have any particular claim to spirituality and separability—both 
in being and in operation.      
 The consequences of this fully naturalistic view are clear: the human soul is a material and 
extended entity, just like that of any non-rational animal, such as a donkey (Blasius’ own example). 
Likewise, it has no proper, i.e. independent, operation apart from the body in which it exists. In a 
stronger sense than any medieval hylemorphic model, for Blasius the operations of the soul are also 
operations of the body, for instance the function of thinking requires the use of phantasms which, in 
turn, cannot be found without the body. In this context, it makes no sense to say that the intellective 
soul does not override, direct, control or even resist the sensitive soul because it is in being and in 
operation one with it. To say that it exercises different operations in different parts of the body means 
                                               
11 “quaero, igitur, an aliqua evidentia te moveat, an sola auctoritas te compellat.”, Qa I.8, 78. 
12 “Nihil, ergo, prohibet quin materia illa, sic praeparata ex puris naturalibus, non recipiat formam quae habebit virtutem 
discernendi, sillogizandi etc. quae a vulgaribus intellectiva nominatur,” Qa I.8, 79.  
13 “… anima intellectiva est educta de potentia materiae,” Qa I.8, 87. 
14 “et dico quod ipsa summe disponitur per qualitativas dispositiones et non per animam vegetativam vel sensitivam.”, Qa 
II.4, 103.  
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nothing in terms of what concerns what the soul is, but simply on the way it brings about its 
operations: it walks by means of feet and it thinks in the head and the heart (Qa I.8, 84; see, however, 
II.4,105). These bodily locations are required as instruments for its action qua material principle. 
Applied to sensation, Blasius makes clear that we can say that sensation is an operation of the soul or 
even better that it is an operation of the composite of soul and organ. The important point is that there 
is no basic ontological distinction within the soul that performs all these operations, whereby part or 
aspect, or power of it would be immaterial or body-independent, and another would be material and 
body-dependent for its operation because:  
 
there is no doubt that the intellective soul is the soul that sees and the soul that hears and the 
nutritive soul, and this about [all] other [functions].15  
          
This passage is a clear statement of Blasius’ overarching argument according to which all 
psychological functions are of one and the same soul, a single unified and material principle of 
operation and being. The simplicity of the soul is the result not of the soul’s immateriality, as 
commonly argued, but rather of the soul’s material nature.16  
 There is one important objection that Blasius brings forth in the text against his own view, 
which concerns the issue of self-reflexivity. That is to say, how can the soul know itself and its acts, 
if it is a material entity. The basic assumption, shared by most medieval thinkers, is that self-
reflexivity of the kind that allows the soul to take itself as an object of cognition is a property of what 
is immaterial in a proper sense. So, for instance, the senses cannot perceive their own acts, except in 
a very insipid manner and even the intellect, for Aristotelians at least, can only perceive its acts 
indirectly—by being aware that they are about certain objects. For Augustinians, on the other hand, 
the mind is transparent to itself, i.e. has unmediated access to itself and its acts. Blasius opts in a sense 
for a middle way, claiming that, on the one hand, the eye does not see itself and does not see itself 
seeing, but that, on the other hand, the soul does know itself and knows itself seeing. He further 
specifies that the seeing-itself function is located in the heart—in fact, he explicitly says that the soul 
knows itself seeing by means of the heart, but in other places Blasius seems to have a more ambivalent 
attitude to locating specific mental functions in particular body parts (Qa III.2, 128). In any case, for 
our purposes what matters is that Blasius explicitly denies that the kind of reflexivity necessary for 
                                               
15 “Unde non est dubium quod anima intellectiva est anima visiva et auditiva et nutritiva et sic de aliis,”, Qa I.8, 84.  
16 “non potest efficaci ratione concludi quod intellectus humanus sit forma simplex et immaterialis.”, Qa III.2, 128. 
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self-awareness is dependent on the soul being an immaterial substance. For this reason alone, Blasius 
makes an important contribution to the way we think about the conditions of satisfaction of the full 
range of cognitive operations in terms compatible with (and determined by) the human condition as 
embodied. Together his model offers a fully naturalistic account of cognition, the coming into being 
of the soul—here understood as generation rather than creation—and finally of the interaction 
between body and soul. 
 I have, until now, focused on the first part of the problem raised at the beginning of the paper, 
namely the ontological claim concerning the unity of the human soul. That has also allowed us to 
make some general conclusions regarding the way the nature of cognition is shown to be dependent 
on the nature of the soul: what the soul can do is determined by the nature of its being, which in this 
case is material and extended. The suggestion is that the way the human soul knows, both in 
perception and in intellectual cognition, must be very similar across the spectrum, because it is the 
same entity that performs all the different kinds of cognitive operations. As such, this offers quite a 
contrastive picture with respect to traditional, especially Aristotelian, theories of cognition. The 
question to ask next is how exactly are we to understand this in terms of the other claim made at the 
beginning of this paper: that at the core of this model of cognition is a particular cognitive faculty 
that operates at the interface of sensation and intellection. Better yet: that it is that interface because 
it is one and the same thing through and through – the same thing that senses and understands.    
 
III. The second ontological thesis: unity of operation 
The best way to show that there is no distinction between the sensitive and intellective souls and the 
need for their joint operation is to show what that distinction would look like. That at least seems to 
be Blasius’ procedure. He asks us to consider the contrast between what we perceive and what we 
know, as in the case of our perception of the sun being smaller than the earth and the knowledge that 
the earth is bigger than the sun (so he thought). If it is the case, he argues, that these two kinds of 
knowledge are in opposition, they must correspond to two distinct functions and two distinct kinds of 
function, at that. Therefore, the powers responsible for such distinctive types of cognition must also 
be distinct. Further examples could show the conflict between kinds of knowledge and also powers 
of a different kind, like those of the will and the intellect. The underlying argument for this view is 
that differentiation of function necessarily introduces a plurality of powers, which in turn, if qualified 
as of a different kind, should introduce a multiplication of souls or aspects or parts within one and the 
same soul. 
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 That is certainly not Blasius’ own view, and he takes particular issue with the principle that a 
plurality of powers must follow from a plurality of operations. If that were the case, he goes on 
arguing, whatever thing is capable of multiple effects, must be constituted by a plurality of principles 
of operation. Let us consider the case of fire, for instance, which is able to burn—but also to dry 
leather (my example)—or the liquefying of certain metals (Blasius’ example, Qa II.4, 91-2). It must 
be noted that this is a stock objection from those defending the unicity of substantial form, to which 
pluralists (those defending a plurality of substantial forms) often reply: the principle of distinction 
between potentiae is not merely that the production of different effects/operations requires different 
potentiae, but rather that different potentiae are required by operations of different kinds.17 Blasius 
himself recognizes this when he later on in the same question notes that there cannot be many 
substantial forms of different kinds (diversarum rationum: Qa II.4, 93) in one and the same living 
being. Blasius insists that we could but should not conclude the diversity of powers from the diversity 
of acts (Qa II.4, 102). It is significant that Blasius partly concedes the argument, by noting that nothing 
decisive can be achieved in this respect. It seems rather that he finds himself on safer ground in his 
argument from separation, which runs as follows.  
 God can make anything except what entails a logical contradiction. Let us imagine a human 
being that is constituted by a sensitive and an intellective soul. Let us also postulate that these two 
(sensitive and intellective) are different souls in a human being. Suppose now that God removes the 
intellective soul from that composite. The resulting being would still have a sensitive soul, meaning 
that it still remains an animal. The question one could ask would be: to what species does that animal 
belong? However, let us imagine that instead of removing the intellective soul from the composite, 
God removes the sensitive soul: that being would remain a human being (due to the intellective soul), 
but would lack, however, all capacity for sensation—exactly what characterizes an animal. Both 
examples seem to lead to absurdities and thus display an essential issue with the traditional model. In 
the face of this, Blasius argues that there must simply be one soul in any one human being, and 
furthermore that such a soul is an intellective one that is also responsible for the nutritive and sensitive 
functions.  
 Taken like this, the result looks very much like Thomas Aquinas’ unicity theory of the human 
composite according to which there is only one substantial form, which is the intellective or rational 
soul. There is, however, one significant qualification that distinguishes the two: for Aquinas the 
                                               
17 On this topic, see J.F. Silva, Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul. Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth 
Century. Leiden 2012, 97-105; see also J. Biard, “Diversité des fonctions et unité de l’âme dans la psychologie 
aristotélicienne (XIVe-XVIe siècles),” Vivarium 46 (2008), 342-67.  
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nutritive, sensitive, and intellective are aspects of the same soul with the first two being present in the 
latter in a somewhat subdued or subsumed state. For Blasius, on the other hand, they are one and the 
same, so that the sensitive soul of a human being and that of any other non-rational animal, for 
example a donkey, cannot be of the same kind (non sunt eiusdem rationis, Qa II.4, 93). Instead of 
claiming that this so, Blasius argues that what makes it different in kind is that the sensitive soul of 
the human being is inherently rational, whereas that of the animal is not. Blasius argues this way 
because there is something in addition to the sensitive soul of a human being (or of the donkey) that 
makes it to be “of a different kind”—which would be problematic for a number of reasons. To be a 
human being does not mean to one composed of subsumed or “virtually contained” parts, but rather 
to be one in the sense of absolute simplicity in being and in operation: it is the intellective soul that 
is simultaneously the nutritive soul, not by reduction but by identity. Aquinas would never have 
accepted the “one in operation” thesis because he would have denied its premise: that the intellect 
cannot operate without the body. For Blasius, however, it is precisely that non-separability grounding 
the ontological identity and that ontological identity grounding the concurrent nature of the soul’s 
cognitive operations. If the claim seems radical, it is because it really is so, and the implications for 
the epistemological claim should now be evident: if the sensitive and the rational are one and the 
same soul (identity thesis), and the cognitive powers of the soul are one with the soul (reduction 
thesis), that means that it is one and the same power, as it were, that is responsible for the cognitive 
operations of both sensing and understanding. This much is clear, but what remains to be fleshed out 
is the central issue of what it means to say that they are one and the same power.  
    I propose that we tackle the issue in two moments: first, by considering question thirteenth 
of book two of the Quaestiones de anima; and, second, by turning to Blasius’ treatise on Optics. In 
the Quaestiones Blasius starts very promisingly by clarifying the meaning of the different terms used 
when discussing perception. He distinguishes between the sensibile, i.e. that which can be sensed, 
like a color or a sound; the sensitivum, i.e. that which does the sensing, which is the soul; sensus, 
which can stand for either the act of sensing or the soul that senses; sentire, the operation of the soul 
by means of which the animal senses; and finally, sensatio, which means the kind of cognition proper 
to the senses, that is sensation (Qa II.13, 118-19). After this terminological clarification, he goes on 
to present two contrasting views on the nature of sensation, as a possible answer to the question: quae 
res est sentire? According to the first alternative, sensation is a passive process characterized by the 
soul receiving the sensible species from the sensible thing. According to the second alternative, which 
Blasius seems inclined to support (in the sense that he never refutes it), sensation is an active process, 
best described as the soul producing the act of sensation. This happens by actively concurring with 
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the reception of the species, with the sense organ playing the passive role in two separate moments. 
In the first moment, the sense organ receives the species and, in a second moment, the act of sensation 
caused by the soul.18 The species appear in Blasius as the shorthand for visual rays extending from the 
object to the eye (see below), just like it is found in the model of perspectivist optics. From the point 
of view of this account, visual perception depends on, but is not caused by, the reception of sensible 
species in the bodily sense organs. This reception occasions, by constituting the necessary disposition, 
the action of the soul producing the act of sensation, that is to say the actual seeing of the external 
thing.19 That is where the text edited by Vescovini cuts off and there is no more to go on, until the 
much-anticipated critical edition of the whole work appears.20 Nevertheless, there is an alternative 
route, which I suggest we take by turning to the discussion over the nature of vision and the perception 
of distance that we find in Blasius of Parma’s optics treatise entitled Questiones super Perspectiva 
Communi.  
 
IV. The optics of visual perception 
In the Questiones super Perspectiva Communi (QP, hereafter), a commentary to John Pecham’s 
popular optical work,21 Blasius defines vision as being caused by the power of sight with the 
concurrence of the object.22  The power is the internal principle of causation, whereas the object, rather 
than the species it generates, is defined as having the primary external causal role.23 The object concurs 
by means of a varying intensity of the material active qualities it issues forth (QP I.6.2, 117) in the 
forms of rays, which are also called species.24 Blasius follows Roger Bacon in stating that “every 
natural agent, whatever it is, acts on the recipient by means of rays”, even though “rays” does not 
appear in Bacon as one of the many alternative names for “species”.25 In any case, the important and 
                                               
18 “Tertia conclusio: species rerum sensibilium in actu sentiendi active concurrunt ad sensationem. (...) Quarta conclusio: 
anima sensitiva active concurrit ad sensationem.”, Qa II.13, 121-22.  
19 See, e.g., Qa II.13, 123: “Sed secundum determinationem oppositam, dico quod sentire est ipsa anima sensitiva, quatenus 
sensitiva est, connotando cognitionem eius de sensibili.”  
20 For many years, Joël Biard has run a seminar in Tours dedicated to reading and discussing Blasius’ Quaestiones de 
anima. I was fortunate enough to be invited to participate in this seminar and gained a much deeper understanding of both 
Blasius and medieval philosophy in general from this experience.    
21 John Pecham, Perspectiva communis, in John Pecham and the Science of Optics, ed. D.C. Lindberg. Madison, 
Milwaukee 1970. 
22 “visio est quedam cognitio causata a potentia visiva in oculo, obiecto concurrente,” Blasius of Parma, Questiones super 
Perspectiva Communi, ed. G. F. Vescovini and J. Biard, Paris 2009, 71. 
23 QP I.6.2, 118. It is important to note, however, that color is not, per se, the efficient cause of visual perception, because 
all natural actions require efficient causation from celestial bodies, as a form of “flux” (QP I.15.2, 219). 
24 “isti radii visuales, quos philosophi species vocant, non sunt sicut linee mathematicorum, sed cum latitudine et 
profunditate,” QP I.1.4, 73. See also Qa II.13, 119.  
25 Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum, in Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. D.C. Lindberg. 
Oxford 1983. 
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similar claim is that species are naturally generated by material things and representative of them. 26 
As such, it is clear that they play an instrumental role in the perceptual process, with the object and 
the soul playing the primary causal roles.  
 Blasius has much more to say, however, about species; namely, about their nature and their 
relation to the object that generates them. The first thing to make clear is that, for Blasius, species are 
material extended entities, because they are grounded on matter and educed from the potentiality of 
matter (QP I.1.4, 73-4). Species represent qualities, for instance the color white. The question now is 
whether species have the kind of being that allows for producing the kind of change one would call 
alteration, for instance whereby something like a hand becomes white (albifieri) by being in contact 
with something white. Blasius denies that species, qua representative entities, have this kind of 
being—what he calls the “strength” or “vigor” of a primary quality; if that were the case, the same 
change would apply to the medium separating the object from the perceiver, thus making it equally 
e.g. white. Instead, he argues that they have the kind of being of a secondary quality, which means 
that the object does not impart its quality upon the receiving thing but instead its action (of the object 
via the species) perfects an existing potentiality (of the power)—what Blasius calls an “alteratione 
perfectiva” in the Aristotelian spirit of the De anima (the explicit reference is Blasius’ own: “ut 
scribitur secundo De anima”).27  
 The only kind of change the species produces is this perfection of the receiving cognitive 
subject (QP I.6.2, 119). In the case of the species of color causing vision, that means for the quality 
in the generating thing to diffuse its representative species,28 which are imperfect in being with respect 
to the thing they represent. The idea is simple and largely dependent on Bacon’s multiplication 
doctrine: the generated species are ontologically imperfect because they result from a successive 
generation that is dependent on the generating thing qua cause for its continuation in being (QP I.6.2, 
119). There is an ontological causal dependence of the species on the thing it represents, and one 
could add, an epistemic dependence of the perceiving subject on the species: one only perceives what 
is given to one to perceive. This dependence relation also shows that variations of intensity throughout 
the medium and how action at great distance can be explained by pure naturalistic terms. It is only 
normal to expect that qua material entities, species tend to nonbeing (tendent ad non esse), meaning 
that they tend to progressively lose their intensity, for instance in the case of colors, by going from 
white to reddish to violet (alurgum) (QP I.14.1, 203). This ontological aspect of the species has an 
                                               
26 “evidens est quod species est representativa eius cuius est species,” QP I.2.1, 77.  
27 QP I.6.2, 119. On the same principle, see QP I.15.2, 218, and QP I.15.2, 217. 
28 “Et cum species tibi presentata in tali loco sit nata representare obiectum cuius est species,” QP 1.14.1, 204.   
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important epistemological consequence: already from the point of view of what is available to us, 
acts of visual perception are limited to a range of actual but changing qualities thus resulting in partial 
rather than complete knowledge.29 Commenting on the possibility that certain inherent conditions in 
the physiology of the eyes may contribute some distortion to our knowledge of the world, Blasius 
agrees that we do not have as much certainty as we could have, but that is simply how things should 
be.30 As he sharply remarks, our knowledge is inherently limited because “no human cognition can 
exclude all degrees of error.”31  
 Blasius provides an illustrative example of this by pointing out the difficulty of seeing the 
Sun, qua luminous body, by means of the illuminated medium. The issue is whether the light in the 
medium prevents a perceiver from seeing the Sun, just like any species would prevent a perceiver, on 
this account, from perceiving the species-generating thing. Blasius’ solution is to say that a species 
is naturally representative of its object (the object generating it), so that it does not block the access 
to the thing but instead is that which makes this access possible—in the case of the distal senses, like 
sight. Thus, in the case of the Sun, 
 
the light that concurs to this vision is the species of the luminous body diffused by a luminous 
body throughout the medium and representative in the eye of its own proper object, which is 
the body of the Sun.32  
 
Blasius’ point in denying that the species are the proper object of sight is clear enough, but the 
discussion over the Sun introduces another important element: by being a source of light, the Sun is 
to some extent always visible, even when other objects are visible. For such a case, when seeing the 
Moon, one sees the Sun not directly but by means of its light reflected on the surface of the Moon. 
The second important point is that, the more an object lies directly opposite to the perceiver, the better 
it is seen (literally, the stronger is our visual perception of it) because visual rays travel in straight 
lines (QP I.1.3, 71). The same applies to whatever object one sees under normal lightening conditions, 
                                               
29 “Patet etiam quod nulli dubium quod visio est qualitas gradualis, modo sicut non contingit aliquam qualitatem gradualem 
simul totam deperdi, sic non contingit totam adquiri. Et ita putandum est de notitia intellectuali,” QP I.14.1, 203.  
30 “numquam de renaturali per visum et consequenter per intellectum homo habet tantam evidentiam quanta haberi potest; 
et hoc est verum,” QP I.6.2, 119-20. 
31 “... et consequenter causabitur error in intellectu de rebus naturalibus. Ad istud respondetur quod hoc argumentum 
concludit tantum quod numquam de re naturali per visum et consequenter per intellectum homo habet tantam evidentiam 
quanta haberi potest; et hoc est verum. Et sequitur corollarium ex hoc in hac forma quod nulla humana cognitio videtur 
omnem gradum erroris excludere,” QP I.6.2, 120. 
32 “... lumen concurrens ad hanc visionem est species corporis lucidi difusa a corpore lucido per medium in oculum 
representativa sui proprii obiecti, quod est corpus Solis,” QP I.1.3, 70. 
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like a stone in broad daylight, because that which makes a stronger impression on our visual apparatus 
is the stone rather than the illuminating Sun. In consequence, we form a perceptual judgment about 
the stone, not the Sun or the illuminated medium. It is of further interest to note how Blasius 
frequently picks arguments from everyday experience (what he calls “experiential knowledge”: 
“notitia experimentali,” QP 1.6.2, 116); that is to say, from how we perceive the world in our everyday 
interactions with objects in the world, rather than from the “armchair of the philosopher.”    
 Despite this perspectival or incomplete outlook of perception, Blasius is equally adamant that 
what we see is the external thing, rather than the species received in the sense organs. Likewise, he 
dismisses the causal impact of the species, qua visual rays, as unique causes of visual perception by 
noting that the reception of those species in the two eyes do not cause us to see double; that is because 
“the two eyes are informed by the same power of the soul that judges the object” (QP I.1.4, 73). 
Blasius considers in detail the arguments, common at the time, concerning where in the visual 
perceptual apparatus vision took place, namely in the crystallin lens of the eye (in humore glaciali) 
or at the juncture of the optical nerves (in cruciatione nervorum opticorum). Summarizing a lengthy 
scholastic discussion down to the size of a soundbite, the claim is that, if seeing takes place in the 
eye, then one sees one thing as two, as there are two eyes. If, on the other hand, one sees at the 
junction of the two optical nerves, one sees two things close to each other in the visual field – Plato 
and Socrates, to use Blasius’ own example—as one and the same thing. Although Blasius finds 
arguments for preferring the “glacial humor” (I.12.1, 180), the master claim is that the discussion 
over the location of the function is secondary and to some extent futile: visual perception takes place 
in the soul and the soul is present in both eyes (as it is everywhere in the human living body, like the 
two ears). This is an important claim: it is the same power that is present in the two organs (in the 
eyes and in the ears) and this is the same power that produces or makes a perceptual judgement about 
the external object. As such, the soul is not triggered to judge the presence of several distinct objects 
from the reception of a manifold of species.33 That would only be the case if one were to take the 
object or its species, diffused from the object and multiplied in the sense organ, as the cause of vision; 
instead, Blasius argues, it is the (visual) soul (anima visiva) that causes the seeing.34 Another way of 
explaining this is by distinguishing between two stages of vision: one, the reception and apprehension 
of the species diffused by the object and, two, the actual perceptual judgment (iudicio) of the object. 
This in turn can be further divided into “confused judgment” and “complete and perfect judgment” 
(QP 1.12.1, 178). Whereas stage one is caused by the soul with the contribution of the object (via the 
                                               
33 “ipsa anima per pluralitatem specierum non arguit pluralitatem et distinctionem obiectorum,” QP I.12.3, 190. 
34 “obiectum non est illud quod causat visionem in oculo, nec species diffuse ab ipso et multiplicate in oculum, sed est 
anima visive,” QP I.12.3, 190. 
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species), level two is fully explainable by the soul’s activity and to see, Blasius goes on to argue, is 
to have a complete and perfect perceptual judgment of the thing being seen.            
 Repeating a point that he had made clear already in the Questiones de anima, Blasius insists 
that the reception of species in the sense organs—thus, their affection—is required, but not sufficient 
on its own, to cause a visual perception. Adopting an expression that we find in other authors, Blasius 
refers to the perceptual act as the reception of the perceptual (visual) power’s operation (QP I.14.1, 
202). The underlying idea seems to be that as the “seat” of power and as a physical entity, the organ 
is receptive of both the act of the object in the form of the species and the act of the power. The whole 
argument is intended to, as it were, “please two masters”: to emphasise the activity of the soul while 
allowing the species to exert their causal power, within a limited reach. To return to the cereal 
analogy, the grain at the centre of the world will fail to cause the required causal effect in the perceiver 
at the edge of the world. In other words, it is not the case that an object’s causal power (and thus the 
species) is able to act over no matter what expanse (QP I.1.4, 73). But the claim is stronger, as even 
in those cases, when such an action is felt, it is better to say that the object concurs in the production 
of the act of seeing as the causa sine qua non, rather than being the primary cause of seeing. Blasius 
could not be clearer as to what the definition of vision should be: 
 
vision is a mode of cognition caused by the visual power in the eye with the concurrence of 
the object.35 
 
When one says that the eyes see, what we mean is the conjunction of visual power and the sense 
organ it informs,36 thus making it clear that he still operates in the theoretical framework of medieval 
Aristotelianism; but at the same time, the emphasis is on the claim that the object does not cause the 
seeing (non causat visionem), so the reception of the species is not to be identified with perceiving. 
Further evidence for this is that there seems to be no correspondence between the intensity of the 
action of the species and the intensity of the cognitive act. If one is not attending, even an immoderate 
affection can fail to catch the attention of the soul and thus fail to be perceived (QP I.6.2, 117). The 
attention of the visual power (advertentiam potentie visive) rather than the intensity of the species is 
what does the explanatory work on whether x is perceived at all. But immoderateness also concerns 
the size of the object in relation to the distance from the perceiver: if the species on their own would 
explain perception, the species of a grain in the centre of the world would be perceived by any subject 
                                               
35 “visio est quedam cognitio causata a potentia visiva in oculo, obiecto concurrente,” QP I.1.3, 71.  
36 “Aliter possumus dicere quod visio non est nisi oculus videns, intelligendo per oculum aggregatum ex anima et organo 
tali, et idem dico de intellectione,” QP I.1.3, 72. 
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at the limit of that world. Blasius makes it clear that without the soul’s turning and attending to the 
object being presented, there is no perception and no understanding.37 He emphasises how cognitive 
acts are founded upon the “strength of the [soul’s] inner light,”38 not being entirely self-caused but 
having the primary cause in the soul itself and its power for knowledge.  
 Blasius is not satisfied, however, in granting to “the soul” the role of the cause of vision, 
denying that role to both the object and the species. He proceeds by specifying its mode of operation 
as being characterized by combining sensitive and intellective components (QP I.2.2, 78). The 
significance of this combination, which in fact is an identification on the basis of the materialistic 
ontological claims advanced earlier, can be fully grasped when we consider what is the content of 
perception.  
   
V. The content of perception 
Having made a number of substantial claims concerning the nature of the soul and cognition in 
Blasius, it is now time to show what, exactly, it means to say that the senses and intellect operate 
together in visual perception and what cognitive power combines those two aspects. The answer to 
that question is a description of what the content of human perceptual experiences consists in.  
 A key thought present in Blasius’ theory of visual perception is that seeing is primarily about 
the quantitative dimensions of the thing seen, as he advocates in the following passage:  
 
sometimes vision is taken for the species of the thing impressed in the eye. A second way of 
taking vision is as the general cognition of the object. A third way to understand vision is as 
distinct knowledge, by which we distinguish the whole from the parts and by means of this 
vision we understand the quantity of the thing.39  
 
So, an act of visual perception includes—and is in fact only completed—when one becomes 
acquainted with the quantitative features of the perceived thing. The first information one gets about 
something present to our visual field is its size because species are, as shown before, best described 
                                               
37 “ubi anima non advertat, non causatur visio nec intellectio,” QP I.10.3, 162. See QP I.14.1, 204, on the non-voluntariness 
of cognitive acts.  
38 “ipsa, vigore sui luminis, fit sciens,” QP I.1.3, 70.  
39 “aliquando capitur visio pro specie rei visibilis impressa in oculo. Secundo modo capitur pro visio pro generali 
cognitione ipsius obiecti. Tertio modo capitur visio pro cognitione distincta, qua distinguimos totum a partibus, per quam 
visionem apprehendimus rem quam sit,” QP 1.14.1, 201.  
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as visual rays. These rays, following the tradition of geometrical optics of the perspectivi (the 
followers of Alhacen’s optical theory, such as Peckham, whose work Blasius is discussing), pass 
through the transparent illuminated medium (air or water) and are received in the surface of the eye, 
which is a convex lens. Without going into the details of the model, it is enough to present two of its 
key theses: first, of all the rays received at the surface of the eye, only those that reach the lens 
perpendicularly are primarily further processed. That means that, for each point of the 
issuing/represented object, only one such ray reaches the eye at the correct (straight) angle and thus 
there is no multiplication of processed rays corresponding to one and the same part of the object. 
Other rays received at different angles are refracted at the surface of the eye and are ‘secondarily’ 
processed, meaning that they help to fill the picture of the object, rather than to properly represent a 
given part. The second thesis is that, upon being received at the surface of the eye, the rays continue 
to a central point, where the processing takes place, so that the resulting image of the object bears a 
one-to-one correspondence with the external thing. All information coming from the object, in the 
form of species or rays, “fits” within a pyramid that has the apex at the centre of the eye and the sides 
on the extremes of the object perceived.40  
 Thus, the perception of the size of the object is dependent on the angle of these visual rays 
that represent the limits of the body of the object. But, for Blasius that is not enough because the 
distance to an object must be known in order to properly adjudicate its size.41 He explicitly notes that 
the quantity of the rays (the quantity of the angle) is essential in order to understand the “how much” 
of the object, but this is not enough. The trouble is that the distance to an object—and distance 
between objects in the visual field—is not among those sensible properties that are represented by 
species and, thus, cannot be accounted for by the visual power alone. Instead, this requires the visual 
power to be assisted and directed by superior cognitive powers (QP I.16.2, 225). The first of these 
powers that play a role in visual perception of quantity is the power of discrimination (virtus 
distinctiva). Blasius does not elaborate much on this power, which is found elsewhere in the 
perspectivist tradition, namely in Alhacen, but he does significantly identify this power with the 
common sense of the Aristotelian tradition, the central perceptual capacity.42 What he does describe 
is that they work together (concurrente), so that the power of sight perceives the quantity of the angle 
                                               
40 “…res, quantumcumque magna, tantum informat de humore glaciali quantum est illud quod intercipitur inter latera 
pyramidis concurrentia ad angulum rectum in oculo,” QP I.16.1, 224. 
41 I cannot go into the details here, having done so elsewhere. Please see J. F. Silva, “Perceptual Judgment in Late Medieval 
Perspectivist Psychology,” Filosoficky Casopis 2 (2017), 29-60.  
42 QP I.16.3, 230. On the reduction of the internal senses to the common sense in Blasius, see O. Rignani, “Baigio Pelacani 
e il senso agente,” in G. F. Vescovini, V. Sorge, and C. Vinti (eds.), Corpo e Anima, Sensi Interni e Intelletto dai Secoli 
XIII-XIV ai Post-Cartesiani e Spinoziani. Turhout 2005, 256-57. See also J. Biard, “Le système des sens dans la 
philosophe naturelle du XIVe siècle (Jean de Jandun, Jean Buridan, Blaise de Parme),” Micrologus X (2002), 335-51. 
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and the power of discrimination makes a judgment, inferentially (illatione), about the size of the 
object on the basis of knowledge about its distance. The knowledge about distance, on the other hand, 
is an operation performed by the intellect, which thus must interfere and play a role in the occurring 
perceptual experience. 43 But the knowledge resulting from this interference is not limited to distance 
but includes knowledge of the proportions of the body, the relation between its parts—done by means 
of “scanning” the object from different viewpoints (delatione axis super visibile, QP 1.14.1, 202)—
and the relation to other objects in the visual field.44  
 There are two other exceedingly important claims that Blasius makes concerning visual 
perception: the first is that there is no quantity that cannot be perceived.45 The idea is that one can 
always find the conditions under which the perception of even the smallest quantity can be realized. 
This is a general claim about the inherent perceptible nature of quantity, not about the conditions 
under which it takes place. The second claim is that perception of quantity is always a rational process 
because the intellect is essential to calculate any quantity made present to a cognitive subject.46 This 
is a claim about the nature of visual perception, not about the particular mechanisms that make it 
possible. There is, in a sense, a correspondence between the two, i.e. between the perceptibility of 
things from the point of view of quantity and the perceptiveness of the human rational soul, which 
takes that quantity as the object of its cognitive acts.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this article, I examined two important aspects of Blasius of Parma’s theory of the soul and 
cognition: the first is the advocated thesis of the ontological identity of senses and intellect. Blasius 
presents a string of arguments to demonstrate how the intellect is not separable from the body in its 
operations, which means that it operates in and through the body and thus is a material substance with 
the body. Once he has shown that the intellect is one in being with the body, he proceeds by 
                                               
43 “Tertia evidentia: tripliciter contingit nos habere cognitionem rei quante. Uno modo solo visu concurrente et hoc scientur 
per quantitatem anguli ut videbitur in questione vel secundum quod plus vel minus informabitur de humore glaciali. 
Secundo modo possumus cognoscere rem quanta sit per visum, virtute distinctiva concurrente, et hoc fit per angulos 
relatos ad distantiam secundum quod apparebit. Tertium modo possumus apprehendere rem quanta sit per visum intellectu 
concurrente, et hoc per modo investigamus quantitatem et proportiones corporum per lineas, per diametra et per alia ut 
dicetur,” QP I.16.1, 224. See also QP I.16.2, 226: “visus intellectuali iudicio concurrente, potest longitudinem radiorum 
comprehendere, idest distantiam in qua vel per quam visibile ab oculo distat.”  
44 “cognoscere hoc obiectum vel illud quantum sit, est cognoscere proportionem illius obiecti quanti ad quantitatem notam. 
(...) Sed cognoscere hoc ... est cognoscere quantum hoc sit sub relatione ipsius ad alterum notum, et hoc non est nisi 
cognoscere proportionem eius ad illud,” QP 1.16.1, 223.  
45 “nulla est insensibilis quantitas”, QP 1.16.2, 227.  
46 “omni quantitate data, quantumcumque magna vel parva, potest visus mediante claro intellectu per angulos cum relatione 
unius obiecti, vel plurium, ad distantias, quanta sit, calculare.”, QP 1.16.2, 227.   
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demonstrating that the senses and intellect are one in operation: it is one and the same soul that both 
perceives and understands. With this “identity thesis” secured, Blasius advances his second main 
thesis, which concerns the soul’s “integrated mode” of operation in perception. The claim is that sense 
and intellect operate together producing a judgment about the object of perception. As Blasius takes, 
originally, the view that perception is primarily about quantity, the concurrent operations of sensory 
and intellectual powers produces this judgment about the object’s quantitative features, ranging from 
the perception of size to relative disposition of its parts and spatial disposition in the visual field 
relative to other objects. The epistemological claims that Blasius is able to make about the content of 
perception are made possible and justified by the way he grounds them on the unity of the cognitive 
subject: a material soul that is free from the constraints resulting from the separation between the 
physical-operating and the spiritual-operating faculties (or parts). He frames the issue of how we 
know the external world not in terms of cooperation among powers of different kinds (be that 
connexio or colligantia potentiarum), but in terms of one soul that is both sensory and rational. By 
doing so, he also carves a special place for his non-modular, identity theory in the history of 
philosophy of perception.       
 
